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post-communist transition in the 1990s*
Abstract
Using a novel data set from post-communist countries in the 1990s, this paper examines
linkages between political constraints, economic reforms and growth. A dynamic panel
analysis suggests public support for reform is negatively associated with income inequality
and unemployment. Both the  and 	 political constraints of public support
affect progress in economic reform, which in turn influences economic growth. The
findings highlight that while economic reforms are needed to foster growth, they must be
designed so that they do not undermine political support for reform.
	





*  We are grateful to Pertti Haaparanta for his helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this
paper was presented at seminars at the Bank of Finland, the WIDER, the University of Cambridge, and the
University of Nottingham. We would like to thank seminar participants for their useful comments and
suggestions.
				: B-Y Kim, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park,
Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K., email: bykim@essex.ac.uk, and Jukka Pirttilä, Clare Hall, Herschel Road,
Cambridge, CB3 9AL U.K., email: JOP22@econ.cam.ac.uk.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
evidence from post–communist transition in the 1990s
6
Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä
The political economy of reforms: Empirical evidence from
post-communist transition in the 1990s
Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan poliittisten rajoitteiden, talousuudistusten ja
talouskasvun välisiä yhteyksiä k äyttämällä hyväksi uutta 1990-luvun tutkimusaineistoa
siirtymätalousmaista. Dynaamiseen paneeliestimointiin perustuvien tulosten mukaan
talousuudistusten  saama julkinen tuki vähenee tuloerojen ja työttömyyden kasvaessa. Ns.

 ja 	 -poliittiset rajoitteet, jotka viittaavat talousuudistusten saamaan tukeen,
vaikuttavat valittuihin talousuudistuksiin. Niillä on puolestaan myönteinen vaikutus
talouskasvuun. Tulosten mukaan talousuudistukset johtavat talouskasvuun, mutta  ne pitää
suunnitella siten, ettei uudistusten julkinen tuki rapaudu.
		: poliittiset rajoitteet, talousuudistukset, siirtymätaloudet, kasvu, dynaamiset
paneelimallit

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1  Introduction
Honest policy advice from economists often collides with political reality. When political
reality wins out, first-best solutions are not implemented. Economic debates, in contrast,
traditionally focus on what constitutes good economic policy without necessarily taking
political constraints into account. In recent years, interest has revived in the practical, yet
equally inspiring, aspects of economic policy −  political economy. The much-debated
books of Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) reflect this growing taste for
political economy.
1 These studies touch on the political economy of reforms, an area that
several questions. How is reform progress determined? What determines support for
reform? How can reforms be best implemented? Is there an optimal speed and sequencing
of reforms?
The collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, as
well as their subsequent transition towards market economies, was arguably one of the
most far-reaching economic events of the 20
th century. Pain accompanied the economic
transition process; all countries experienced a major fall in output after the start of reforms.
A majority of the transition countries saw sharp increases in income inequality and
unemployment. In Russia, for example, output declined by about 40% from 1992 to 1997,
unemployment rose from 4.8% in 1992 to 10.9% in 1997, and income inequality expressed
by Gini coefficient soared from 26.9 to 48.3. Most of the countries started to grow only
towards the end of the 1990s. Even now, the sustainability of Russia’s long-waited
economic boom is dubious.
The transition countries in the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe are unique
in that their transitions have involved simultaneous democratisation and marketisation.
Almost all countries attempted political liberalisation by establishing democracy and civic
freedom at the early stage of the transition. From early on, all wide-ranging economic
reforms must have been passing through the political process. With worsening economic
conditions in the early years of transition, one would expect indications of an immediate
feedback from economic experience to politics to block the implementation of radical
market reforms either through political pressure on the reform-oriented government or by
reinstating a communist or socialist party at election time.
Policy choices varied markedly across these transition economies. Countries were
often classified as full (big-bang) reformers or as partial reformers. Policies were
especially distinct with respect to the austerity imposed by stabilisation, speed and forms of
privatisation, and tolerance of rent-seeking behaviour. This indicates politics, and more
specifically mass support, has been important for policymaking.
The combination of the sudden start of transition, the rapid establishment of
democratic institutions affecting the nature and speed of reforms, and variances in policy
choices across transition countries provides a unique opportunity (arguably, close to
laboratory conditions) to investigate the interaction of the political process and economic
reforms. Unlike in Latin America and East Asia countries, which have a long history of
path-dependence of reforms, the Eastern European transition experience offers an
unrivalled opportunity to test political economy theories of reform. In the case of East
Asian economies, in contrast, economic reforms generally preceded political
transformation reforms, suggesting feedback from economic experience to politics was
slow and weak.
                                                
¹ Rodrik (1996) provides an earlier synthesis.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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The rising interest in the political economy of reforms in transition countries is reflected in
the growing volume of theoretical and empirical research. Among these, Blanchard (1997)
highlights the interactions between macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and
budget deficits, and the optimal speed of transition reforms. Roland (2000) focuses on how
political constraints determine a reform path. Empirical studies (e.g. Berg et al 1999;
Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; and Campos and Coricelli, 2002) suggest economic reforms
(liberalisation and restructuring), prudent macroeconomic policies (low inflation and small
budget deficits) and beneficial initial conditions (including relatively small distortions
before transition, the experience of pre-transition reforms and beneficial geographical
location) are crucial determinants of growth during transition. Nevertheless, macro-level
empirical studies have tended to overlook the interactions between economic reforms,
political constraints and growth.
2 As a result, many recent theories have yet to be tested.
We attempt here to fill the gap between the key theories of the political economy of
reforms and empirical research on growth in transition countries. We use a novel data set
that makes it possible to build a dynamic panel econometric model to test the relationships
between public support for reforms, progress in reforms, and economic growth.
We first examine what determines support for economic reform among citizens. Our
key focus is on how economic outcome from earlier reforms and the material welfare of
individuals (in terms of e.g. growth, inflation, unemployment and income inequality) affect
support for future reforms. Public support for reform is likely to act either through 	
political constraints (blocking reforms before they are launched) or   constraints
(backlash and policy reversal).
Second, we test the extent to which these political constraints have influenced the
nature of economic policies. This can be viewed as a way to study empirically the validity
of political economy models of reforms in a transition context. The chosen reform may
even be related to past macroeconomic outcomes, opening the way to testing of policy
endogeneity to economic variables highlighted in the optimal speed literature, e.g.
Blanchard (1997).
Third, we examine how reforms affect growth, employing dynamic panel models that
address some of the issues overlooked in the existing literature on growth in transition
countries. These include a treatment of the three equations of the determinants of growth,
support for reforms and progress in reforms as a system, and taking account of the dynamic
nature of transitions using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991).
Our results suggest that support for reform depends on past macroeconomic
performance, especially factors such as unemployment, inflation and income inequality
that directly affect personal welfare. Support for reform, in turn, is a crucial determinant of
the reform path. This finding implies that political constraints have played a key role in
shaping economic policies in transition countries. Thus, transition reforms are not an
exogenous process but crucially dependent on political economy considerations. In
addition, we find that accumulated reform progress affects economic growth positively,
which dominates the negative short-run impact of reform on growth.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews theoretical research on the political
economy of transition and earlier empirical work on growth in transition countries. Section
3 explains our empirical approach. We present our main results in Section 4 and check for
their robustness in Section 5. We summarise our findings in Section 6.
                                                
2 Some studies, e.g. Fidrmuc 2000, Jackson et al (2001) and Warner (2001), build on evidence from election
results in individual countries.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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2  Public support, reform progress and economic
       growth in  transition countries: A literature survey
2.1  Political constraint of economic reform and
        determinants of public support
In any democracy, decisions to launch or continue major reforms require sufficient public
support. Emphasising the importance of political constraints in adopting and carrying out a
reform program, Drazen (2000, p. 624) claims, “for a program of reform and transition to
succeed, it must have the necessary political support at crucial decision stages.” Given high
uncertainty about the outcome of reforms and the freshness to democratic processes and
institutions, one might well argue political constraints play an important role in
policymaking in transition countries.
Several studies analyse the role of political constraints on economic reforms. Rodrik
(1994) argues that the consequences of reform often involve the redistribution of income
among different groups. Thus, economic reforms are avoided or implemented only
gradually unless the efficiency gain from reforms is substantial and income is redistributed
in a way that minimises opposition. The probability of voting against reform may thus
increase with individual uncertainty. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) suggest that some
eventual winners may even vote against an efficiency-gaining reform package when losers
are not identified 	
 political constraints are analysed in Wyplosz (1993) and Dewatripont and
Roland (1995). In more detail, Wyplosz (1993) maintains that continuation of a reform
requires a more stringent condition compared to a condition that enables the start of
reform. This model assumes the unanimity rule, whereby governments focus on income
distribution between the losers and winners, even when the losers are minority.
Dewatripont and Roland (1995) provide a model that contains both aggregate and
individual uncertainties. Due to aggregate uncertainties, a partial implementation of
reforms might be beneficial for the society because of an early reversal option. Sequencing
is also important; a partial reform that increases the welfare of a median voter will lead to
the continuation of another reform as long as the aggregate outcome is positive. This
suggests that starting with a reform that increases the welfare of a majority runs a smaller
risk of reversal.
If political constraints are important for the start and continuation of a reform, the
government needs to design mechanisms to compensate losers. Otherwise, a status-quo
bias or reform reversal are likely. For example, unemployment is very likely to increase
during transition. To avoid opposition to a reform by the unemployed, the government
needs to provide unemployment benefits. In these conditions, Dewatripont and Roland
(1992) point out that a slower, feasible speed of transition may be preferable because the
pressure on fiscal sector is lessened. This has an implication for the optimal speed of
transition. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) highlight the role of fiscal balance affected by
unemployment benefits in the speed-of-reform decision. If the government adopts a big-
bang reform that leads to the shedding of too many jobs, the fiscal burden becomes so
large it makes both the restructured state sector and the private sector unprofitable. This
suggests that there is an a slower, optimal speed of transition that allows both the state andByung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
evidence from post–communist transition in the 1990s
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private sectors to operate at positive profitability while the government maintains enough
public support for the continuation of a reform.
Only a few studies offer empirical evidence that political constraints are important in
shaping the nature, adoption and reversal of reforms. Lora (1998) constructs reform
measures for 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period of 1985-1995, and
then regresses several political and economic variables on the adoption of reforms. The
results suggest that adoption of reforms correlates positively with economic crises such as
GDP contraction and high past inflation.
Fidrmuc (2000) investigates political support for reforms in four transition countries
by looking at the relationship between votes received by various parties (reform support)
and economic factors. He finds that the support for reformist parties is negatively
correlated with unemployment but positively associated with the size of the private sector.
These findings suggest that the distributional aspect of reform is a significant factor
influencing support for reform. Using data on four Polish elections, Jackson et al. (2001)
support the hypothesis that economic factors are important in explaining political support
for reforms. They argue that support for pro-reform parties significantly depends upon
whether job creation in new firms keeps up with job losses at former state-owned
enterprises. Warner (2001) uses data of Russian regions to looks at the effect of reform
progress on support for pro-reform parties in December 1995 parliamentary elections and
finds that reforms created positive political feedback rather than backlash against reforms.
2.2  Reform progress and economic growth
A large number of studies investigate the relationship between economic reform and
economic growth.
￿ Early studies (De Melo et al., 1996; Fischer et al., 1996) find that the
index of reform progress compiled by the World Bank is positively associated with
economic growth. Krueger and Ciolko (1998) criticise such studies by arguing that the
measure of reform is significantly correlated with the initial condition of reforms such as
export share and GNP per capita before the start of the transition. They find that initial
conditions play a larger role in output performance than reform-related variables that
exclude indirect effects on growth through initial conditions. Havrylyshyn et al., (1998)
suggest that, even after controlling for initial conditions, a variable relative to the economic
reform index may be significant. They further show that, while the short-term effect of
reform on growth may be negative, its long-term effect is sufficiently positive to overcome
the short-term loss. Brunetti et al. (1997) emphasise the importance of institutions in
economic performance, finding that variables such as rule of law and corruption
significantly affect economic growth in transition countries. Havrylyshyn and van Rooden
(2000) respond that the impact of institutional development on economic growth, while
statistically significant, is hardly overwhelming. Staehr (2003) examines complementarity
and sequencing of reforms and argues that a simultaneous implementation of various
reform policies instead of sequential one is preferred for an efficiency consideration but the
speed of reform has little impact on growth.
Existing empirical studies suffer from substantial methodological drawbacks. First,
few make much effort to capture the dynamic nature of economic growth. Yet, as a
dynamic phenomenon, early positive growth may provide momentum for further growth in
                                                
3 Harvylyshyn et al., (1998) and Campos and Coricelli (2001) provide a survey of empirical studies on
economic growth in transition economies.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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later years, say, by increasing agents’ confidence in the economy, providing the
government with more room for policy manoeuvres or reducing political constraints so as
to free up resources to enhance economic growth. Second, although many variables used as
dependent or independent variables are potentially correlated, existing studies tend to pay
insufficient attention to the issues of endogeneity and multi-collinearity. For example, an
unobserved shock may cause correlation between error terms and economic growth.
Moreover, while the exchange rate regime is correlated with inflation rates, the speed of
privatisation may be correlated with fiscal balance of the economy.
Berg et al. (1999) attempt to deal with the above criticisms. They include previous
economic growth as regressors for the estimation of current economic growth and use IMF
targets for macroeconomic variables as a proxy for an index of reform progress to mitigate
the endogeneity problem of the measure of reform progress. Although no single policy
variable is sufficiently robust to exclusion tests, they find reform-related measures are
often significant. Yet, one can argue that instrumenting only the reform index and
estimating the model using a fixed-effects estimator is a partial solution. Moreover,
including lagged growth variables as regressors creates so-called Nickell’s bias.
Even ignoring the methodological problems, the literature on economic growth
overlooks another potentially important issue, i.e. how reform progress is determined. The
theoretical literature reviewed above suggests political constraints should affect the nature
and speed of reform. By treating reform progress as exogenous, earlier literature on
economic growth disregards the possibility of feedback from economic performance onto
reform progress through public support for the reform.
3  Empirical framework and econometric methods
3.1  Reform support
We assume that support for a market-oriented reform is a function of variables that can be
classified into three groups: income distribution, macroeconomic performance, and time-
invariant fixed effects. We include income inequality and unemployment as income
distribution-related variables to use them as a proxy of  political constraints. The
importance of the two variables in explaining support for reform has been extensively
discussed in several studies (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Wyplosz, 1993; Aghion
and Blanchard, 1994; Fidrmuc, 2000). Inflation and economic growth rates, which
represent macroeconomic performance, likely, but not exclusively, affect the entire
population of a country in a way that affects the mean of public support. The variables
relating to the third group include all fixed effects including initial conditions and
institutions. It is likely that other country-specific unobserved characteristics affect support
for reform, but we believe that these are captured to a great extent by country-specific


































1 inf ,       (1)
where subscripts  and   denote country and year, respectively, LW is support for
reform towards a market economy, 	LW denotes unemployment rates, 	LW is GiniByung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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coefficients, LW is growth rates of GDP and 	LW denotes log of domestic inflation
rates
4
The dependent variable, , is based on information from the Central and Eastern
Eurobarometer (CEEB) surveys, which were commissioned by the European Union and
had been conducted from 1990 to 1997.
5 Values for other variables are based on official
statistics from the IMF and the EBRD. The countries we are concerned here with are
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
The annual CEEB surveys monitor economic and political changes, as well as
attitudes towards Europe and the European Union. The regular CEEB sample size is about
1,000 respondents per country. The dependent variable, , is measured by subtracting




Note that we specify a dynamic model by including the lagged dependent variable.
Following a general-to-specific approach, we test the dynamic model including all lagged
variables and then present a parsimonious model after deleting insignificant variables. We
start by estimating Equation (1) with a fixed effects model that eliminates country-specific
time invariant variables. Next, we use the GMM model account for measurement errors in
variables and possible endogeneity biases
We test  	 political constraints in contrast with   political constraints.
Equation (1) assumes that public support for a market reform is affected by past and
current economic variables that might determine whether the individual wins or loses.
Indeed, a future probability of winning or losing may also be important. These 	
political constraints are tested using the data from the CEEB surveys. The surveys asked,
 	!"	#			#
$$
The respondent could choose one of the five options. We measure the variable relative
perceived future winning/loss as follows: first we assigned 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 to replies that
the respondent’s situation will get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little
worse and get a lot worse, respectively; second, we obtained the average of such figures
weighted by each share of respondents who answered about their future financial situation.
                                                
4 Data on economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment rates, exchange rate regime, fixed capital
investment and government budget balance are from EBRD Transition Reports (various issues) and the World
Bank database. The source of Gini coefficient is the United Nations University World Institute for
Development Economics Research (WIDER) (data can be downloaded from http://www.wider.unu.edu/). In
order to keep comparability across countries and across years, we used Gini coefficients that are derived from
the TransMONEE dataset available from the WIDER. TransMONEE surveys, which have been implemented
by the UNICEF, have monitored public policies and social conditions in Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. For more detailed information on this dataset, refer to http://www.unicef-
icdc.org/resources/.
5 Responses come from citizens 15 years or older. Respondents are interviewed face-to-face in their private
residences. A multi-stage random probability sample design has been applied to all countries except Hungary,
which adopted a quota sampling technique for survey 2. The details of the surveys and questionnaire are posted
at http://www.social-science-gesis.de/en/data_service/eurobarometer/ceeb/.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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Thus a higher average suggests that more people perceive their future financial situation
will get worse.


































1 inf      (1)
where  LW is the perceived winning/loss in coming twelve months, measured as
explained above.
3.2  Progress in reform
Governments are assumed to consider two factors when they design, adopt and implement
a reform: support from the mass public for a market-oriented reform and macroeconomic
performance. The former may be interpreted straightforwardly: without sufficient public
support, it will be difficult for a government to carry out reform policies.
Macroeconomic performance can directly affect reform progress because it can ease
resource constraints faced by the government. For example, excessive unemployment rates
may affect reform progress not only indirectly by dampening public support for the reform,
but also directly through forcing spending on the social safety net. Government fiscal
balance can also play a role in reform progress. A government with a high fiscal deficit
should find it difficult to pursue policies leading to increases in government expenditure.
For example, a policy of rapid restructuring may result in increases in government
expenditure.










































− −  (2)
where, as the same in Equation (1), i and t denote country and year, respectively. li is
the measure of reform progress, while gbal denotes the share of government budget
balance in proportion to GDP.
For the dependent variable, the measure of reform progress, we use a structural reform
index that represents the level of structural reforms achieved each year. The index was
compiled by the World Bank and has been used in several papers as a proxy of a reform
progress (De Melo et al., 1996; Fischer et al., 1998; Berg et al., 1999).
6 To account for the
endogeneity of reform progress, we employ a two-step approach to estimate Equation (2).
First, we estimate Equation (1), then we substitute support for reform in the current period
(LW) with the predicted value from Equation (1). As in the estimation of Equation (1),
we use both fixed effects model and GMM to estimate Equation (2).
                                                
6 This index is a weighted average of three indices: price liberalisation and competition, trade and foreign
exchange regime, and privatisation and banking reform. For a detailed discussion, see de Melo et al. (1996).Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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3.3  Economic growth
The work on determinants of economic growth in transition countries suggests four groups
of variables determining economic growth, i.e. progress in structural reform,
macroeconomic policies, initial conditions and institutions. We include this key set of
variables by incorporating determinants relating to reform progress and macroeconomic
policies, and by treating variables related to initial conditions and institutions as country-
specific fixed effects.
Our analysis differs from most of the earlier growth literature in the transition context
in that we use the predicted index of reform progress (from Step 2 regressions) rather than
assuming that progress in reforms is entirely exogenous. In addition, we use a dynamic
specification based on the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panels.
Earlier studies generally acknowledge that reforms may undermine growth in the short
term, but add that as their beneficial long-term effect dominates, the overall relation
between reforms and growth is positive. A shortcut to capturing this is to use a short panel
to include both the contemporaneous reform index and lagged cumulative reform index as
right-hand side variables. The prediction here is that contemporaneous reform may have a
negative sign, whereas lagged cumulative reform will clearly have a positive impact on
growth.


























− − −    (3)
where subscripts  and  denote a country and year, respectively.  is accumulated
progress in reform, measured as the sum of the reform index, is a dummy that refers
to whether a country adopts fixed exchange rate regime (=1) or not (=0), and denotes
the index of fixed capital formation. While capital formation is not used in other studies on
growth determinants in transition countries, the literature on economic growth in non-
transition countries frequently uses it as a regressor.
4  Econometric results
4.1  What determines support for reform?
In the first step of our empirical analysis, we examine the determinants of support of
reforms (Equation (1) above). These results are reported in Table 1. The basic results are
obtained from Model 1 (general) and Model 2 (parsimonious),
7 which are based on a fixed
effects estimator.
The results (especially for Model 2) suggest that both increases in lagged
unemployment and lagged inflation reduce support for reforms. This confirms that there is
a feedback from actual economic performance to public opinion about reforms. In addition,
increasing economic inequality (measured with Gini coefficients) reduces support for
                                                
7 As elsewhere in the paper, all the parsimonious models are obtained by dropping insignificant variables one
by one from the general model.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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reforms. One explanation for inflation’s role is that it is linked to wage and pension
rigidities, so nominal price increases reduce real income. Inflation may also have adverse
distributional implications and may therefore also be another proxy for inequality.
Interestingly, growth rates (on which most economic policy focuses) have little impact on
people’s opinion about the benefits of reform.
In addition to fixed effect regressions, we use GMM estimation to control for possible
measurement errors and an endogeneity bias in support for reforms and other variables.
Lagged dependent variables turn out to be insignificant, so our results are based on static
GMM estimation. Results from GMM regressions (Models 3 and 4) confirm the overall
picture. The tests reported revealed no problems in the specifications. Unemployment and
Gini coefficients are clearly significant, whereas inflation is somewhat less significant.
What is the interaction between support for reforms, macroeconomic performance and
chosen economic reforms?
Step 2 regressions examine how chosen economic reforms (measured by the World
Bank aggregate liberalisation index, ) depend on support for reforms and past
macroeconomic performance. This analysis corresponds to Equation (2) in Section 3. Two
linkages are of interest: political economy factors
8 and optimal speed of transition
considerations.
These linkages are tested with a host of econometric specifications. Models 1 and 2
are based on two-step least squares (2SLS) estimation, where support for reform is first
predicted from Step 1 regression and then used as a determinant of chosen reform.
9 The
third model is similar to Model 2, but standard errors are bootstrapped to check if inference
remains the same as in the standard 2SLS with predicted reform. In Models 1-3,
contemporaneous macro-variables are dropped from the model to ensure the results do not
suffer from endogeneity bias. A possible time lag between the implementation of economic
policy and changes in economic performance also motivates this choice. Finally, GMM is
used to allow inclusion of contemporaneous variables. Dynamic specification was first
used (Arellano-Bond one-step estimation with robust standard errors), but as the lagged
dependent variable turned out to be insignificant, the reported results are based on static
GMM. Specification tests detect no problems with the GMM models.
Results are presented in Table 2. The main finding is that the predicted support for
reform is significant for explaining progress in reforms. Said another way, the probability
of carrying out reform continuously is positively associated with public support for
reforms.
10 Likewise, if unsuccessful outcomes of earlier reforms undermine political
support for reforms, future reforms would slow. This provides empirical evidence that
political constraints are an important consideration when politicians decide on the nature
and speed of economic reforms. While intuitively clear, the finding is important in that it
provides empirical evidence for the political economy models of transition.
Another interesting finding relates to the role of unemployment. High unemployment
significantly reduces the pace of reform. Interpreted in the spirit of the Aghion-Blanchard
                                                
8 At this stage, the analysis is related to  political constraints.	 constraints are analysed in section
5.
9 Model 2 is similar to 1 with the exception that lagged fiscal balance (gbal1) and lagged reform are dropped.
10 The  variable is significant in all other specifications except 1 (lagged  and $! may cause
this) and 5 (i.e. the general specification of GMM). The  variable is significant in the final parsimonious
GMM model, Model 6.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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(1994) transition model, the optimal speed of transition is slower because of the effect of
unemployment on a fiscal balance.
11
Finally, while results from the GMM estimation (Models 4 and 5) complement the above
picture, these results must be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size. Support
for reform is still significant, whereas unemployment is not. One explanation is that the
some of the effects of unemployment are channelled through the inclusion of
contemporaneous fiscal balance. Higher unemployment is reflected in a worse fiscal
position, so there should be a positive correlation between fiscal balance and reform
progress. As the budget balance becomes more positive, beneficial reforms once
constrained by fiscal considerations can be implemented at a faster pace.
12
4.2  Explaining growth
Our final step is to examine how progress in reforms and other factors explain economic
growth (corresponding to Equation (3) in Section 3). Results reported in Table 3 reveal
lagged growth is clearly significant. The results further confirm that, in the short term,
predicted reform has a negative sign, and lagged cumulative reform is a quantitatively
larger positive factor and statistically more significant. In Model 1 (without exchange rate),
high inflation undermines growth, whereas inflation is not precisely determined if the
exchange rate regime is included (Model 2). This suggests that fixed exchange rates have
successfully curbed inflation in transition countries during the years of this study. Our
analysis confirms earlier findings on the positive impact of prudent fiscal policy on growth.
Turning to the role of investment, it is somewhat surprising that the contemporaneous
capital formation has a positive sign, when its lagged impact is negative.
4.3  Economic significance
We first divide the countries into two groups in terms of Gini coefficient values from 1992
to 1997, i.e. low and high.
13 To grasp the magnitude involved in our key results, suppose a
country managed to reduce its Gini coefficient by 12.2. This change is equivalent to that
from the mean of high Gini coefficient to the mean of the low Gini coefficient group. Since
the coefficient on Gini and lagged Gini in the regression of support for reform is –0.9 and –
0.97 (Table 1, column 4), respectively, the aggregate impact of changes in the Gini
coefficient on support for reform is 22.8. This leads to an increase in reform progress by
0.096, since the coefficient on support for reform for the estimation of progress in reform
is 0.0042 (Table 2, column 2). In the estimation of economic growth, two independent
variables are constructed based on progress in reform. One is progress in reform itself in a
                                                
11 Although the relationship in their model between unemployment and optimal speed of reform is non-linear
in the sense that small levels of unemployment are useful for reforms. A better test for this theory would add a
non-linear empirical specification.
12 Dewatripont and Roland (1992) construct a model with a trade-off between budget balance and chosen
reforms. Pirttilä (2001) finds empirical support for this theory.
13  The group of low-income inequality include Poland, Slovenia, Czech Rep. Slovakia, Hungary, and
Romania, while that of high-income inequality comprises of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia.
Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine are excluded from this exercise, because data on Gini coefficients are missing
for some years.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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corresponding year and another is accumulated progress in reform. Respective coefficients
on accumulated reform and progress reform, 9.0 and –0.85, (Table 3, column 2), suggest
that an increase in the Gini coefficient by 12.2 induces a 0.8% increase in growth.
14 Since
the mean of annual growth rates among low and high Gini coefficients groups is 1.4% and
–3.7%, respectively, the impact of Gini coefficient accounts for 16% of differences in
annual growth rates between the two groups.
In the same way, we classified the countries into two groups in terms of
unemployment rates from 1992 to 1997, i.e. low and high.
15 The difference in
unemployment rates between these two groups is 6.4%. By applying a similar method as
above, we can conclude that a reduction in unemployment rates by 6.4% will induce a
0.5% increase in annual growth rate if others being equal. The average of annual growth
rates among low and high unemployment countries from 1992 to 1997 is –3.8% and 1.3%,
respectively. This suggests that without political constraints caused by unemployment
aspects, the gap between the two groups would have widened from 5.1% to 5.6%.
For the sake of illustration, suppose Russia reduces income inequality to the level of
Poland, i.e. from 40.4 to 27.4. This should lead to a 0.85% increase in the growth rate. By
the same token, assume Hungary decreased its mean of unemployment rates from 1990 to
1997 to that of the Czech Republic in the same period, i.e. from 9.4% to 3.2%. This
induces an increase in annual growth rates by 0.51% $, which accounts for
about 50% of the difference in the mean of growth rates between the two countries.
5  Robustness analysis
5.1  The role of ex ante and ex post political constraints
We now focus on robustness analysis of Equation (1), by estimating its variant (1)' in
Section 3. Equation (1)' includes  (future loss) as an additional regressor, which can
be interpreted as an  	 political constraint (i.e. a perceived future worsening of
economic conditions reduces support for reform and reform progress). Note that 
political constraints are captured by existing regressors such as unemployment rates and
Gini coefficients.
The findings reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 reveal that as earlier, increasing
economic inequality and unemployment reduce support for reform. An interesting result is
                                                
14 Note that this calculation is based on the assumption that other variables do not change. In fact, from the data
of our sample countries, we find a negative correlation between Gini coefficient and unemployment rates.
More specifically, the average unemployment rate among countries belonging to the low Gini coefficient group
from 1992 to 1997 was 10.2%, while that belonging to the high Gini coefficient group was 7.5%. This implies
that the government might have attempted to reduce income inequality more intensively  by other means in a
country where unemployment rates were higher. Taking account of this negative correlation between income
inequality and unemployment rates, the net growth effect of a reduction in Gini coefficient from high to low
will become smaller, namely from 0.8% per annum to 0.6% per annum, because of a corresponding increase in
an unemployment.
15 The group of low unemployment rates comprises the Czech Republic, Russia and the three Baltic countries,
while that of high unemployment rates include Romania, Hungary, the Solovak Republic, Bulgaria, Slovenia
and Poland. The average annual unemployment rate of the former group of countries from 1992 to 1997 was
5.9%, while that of the latter group was 12.3% for the same period.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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that  negatively correlates with support for reform, i.e. support for reforms depends
both on earlier outcome of the reforms and the perceived future losses.
16 Said differently,
support for reform, which depends on both 	 and  political constraints, is
needed for carrying out actual reforms.
17 Given the significance of  in determining
support for reform, the combined impact of 	 and  political constraints on
economic growth increases significantly. Based on the assumption of changes from the
mean of Gini coefficient in the high Gini coefficient group to that in the low Gini
coefficient group, and from the mean of  in high  group (that is, 0.72) to the
mean of  in low  group (that is, 0.27), a rise in public support for reform by
decreasing the Gini coefficient and by increasing the share of the population that views
their financial situation positively, as explained above, boosts economic growth by 1.2%
per annum.
18 If we add this to the impact of unemployment on economic growth through
support for reform (based on the assumption of the change from the average
unemployment rates in countries belonging to the group of high unemployment rates to
that belonging to the group of low unemployment rates), the total effect of political
constraints on economic growth is 1.7% per annum.
5.2  Reform indicators
We now turn to measurement issues in capturing actual reforms in Step 2 regressions. The
measure used above, , is an aggregate of the World Bank liberalisation indices, 
(internal or price liberalisation),  (external liberalisation) and  (private sector entry,
capturing e.g. privatisation and corporate governance). One can argue that support for
reform may vary depending on the aspect of reform. To explore this, we use all three
indices separately as dependent variable in Step 2 regressions. It turns out that support for
reform is not significant in explaining internal and external liberalisation. This is
understandable as most countries launched these reforms early in their transition, so 
political constraints could hardly affect these choices.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the results for explaining the private sector entry
variable, . The results show that political support (now lagged) is again significant for
this subset of reforms. Moreover, unemployment slows the speed of restructuring and
privatisation. These results are well in line with the intuition that support for reform is
more likely to be a decisive factor in planning reforms that directly affect the status of
workers (whether or not restructuring actually causes the employees to be laid off). The
fact that unemployment directly influences future restructuring is consistent with the
predictions of the Aghion-Blanchard model.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) produces a wide
set of reform indicators.
19 We construct an average indicator of the following EBRD
indices: small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition
policy, banking reform, price liberalisation and trade and foreign exchange liberalisation.
                                                
16 We also found that predicted reform calculated with  is significant in the Step 2 regression.
17 These results are not reported here, but may be obtained from the authors on request.
18 This is based on the following calculation: the effect of futloss on economic growth = (change in futloss
from high fuloss group to low futloss group) ×  (the coefficient on futloss appearing in table 4) ×  (the
coefficient on predicted reform in table 2) ×  (the coefficient on accumulated reform progress in table 3) = (-
0.45) ×  (-27.6) ×  0.0042 ×  9.0 = 0.46 (%).
19 These were recently backdated to cover years before 1995.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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This index, $#, depicts the cumulative progress in these areas. Its first difference, #$#,
is used as an alternative reform index in Step 2 regressions. These results are covered in
Models 3 and 4 in Table 5. While there are some changes in these results in comparison to
the main set of results of Table 2 above, the main results are fairly robust −  even with the
EBRD index, reform support and unemployment retain their signs and remain significant
in the parsimonious model.
5.3  The role of democracy
The importance of political constraints may vary according to the degree of political
freedom in a country. We examine this by augmenting first- and second-step estimations
with data from Freedomhouse. Freedomhouse rates all countries according to their political
freedom on a scale of 1 to 7. Western-type democracies get a grade of 1 and an absolute
dictatorship gets a 7. We denote this variable by #. Freedomhouse classifies
countries into three groups: free, partially free and not free.
A number of interesting hypotheses arise. Well-established political freedom may
reinforce support for market reforms. Thus, # is included as a determinant of
support for reform in Step 1 regressions below. Second, in Step 2 regressions, the
dependent variable, progress in reforms, may depend on the degree of political freedom,
while the influence of support for reform may hinge on the level of democracy. It is
possible that political constraints are strongest in politically free countries. These
hypotheses are tested by including # directly into Step 2 regressions and by
constructing an interaction variable between freedom and support for reform, i.e.
%&. This interaction term has positive values only if a country is politically
free.
The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 and columns 5 and 6 of Table
5. For the sake of brevity, only results based on GMM estimations are reported here.
20
Consider first the results of explaining support for reform in Table 4. An increase in the
political freedom in the country (a decrease in the #value) increases support for
market-oriented reforms. The role of other determinants remains the same. Similarly to the
results of Fidrmuc (2001), increase in political freedom is also positively correlated with
actual progress in reforms (Table 5, column 6). However, the interaction variables
 and lagged  are not significant in explaining progress in reforms. Thus,
while politically free countries are likely to become more economically free, the strength
of political constraints does not vary significantly among politically free and less free
countries. One explanation is that most of the countries in the sample have been classified
as free or partially free over the whole estimation sample. In addition, even in the absence
of complete political freedom, country leaders may have been dependent on the public
opinion through indirect routes, e.g. pressure to change the political system.
                                                
20 Results from LSDV regressions were qualitatively similar and may be obtained from the authors on request.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
evidence from post–communist transition in the 1990s
20
6  Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationships between public support for reform, actual
progress in reform and economic growth. To measure support for a market-oriented
reform, we used a novel data set from post-communist countries from 1990 to 1997 −  the
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys.
We used a fixed effect panel and GMM estimator to estimate three equations, taking
into account endogeneity of support for reform and actual progress in reform for the
determination of economic growth. Our results suggest that both   and  	
political constraints influenced reform progress in these countries; a finding that supports
predictions of key theoretical work on transition economics. Public support for reform is
positively associated with favourable economic conditions affected by earlier reforms and
negatively correlated with increases in income inequality and unemployment. Support for
reform progress and unemployment affected actual progress in reforms, which in turn were
associated with economic growth.  In terms of economic significance, our results indicated
that a combined impact of political constraints on economic growth, defined as the sum of
the growth effect of   political constraints caused by income inequality and
unemployment aspects as well as that of 	 political constraints, would be as much as
1.7% per annum. In more particular, a decrease in income equality in Russia to the level of
income inequality in Poland would have increased Russia’s annual growth rates by 0.85%.
Our analysis highlighted the fact that, while economic reforms are needed to foster
growth, they must be designed in such a way that they do not undermine political support
for reform. Thus, policies reducing harmful social impacts of economic growth such as
rising inflation, unemployment or income inequality (all justifiable in their own right) need
to be framed in the context of market-oriented reforms. These policies form a crucial
element of a successful reform package, even from the efficiency point of view.
Due to the paucity of data, our analysis was abstracted from a number of potentially
important themes. One such theme is the role of international financial institutions. Many
transition countries have followed, to some extent, policy advice from such institutions as
the IMF. This suggests the chosen reform policies may reflect other considerations other
than support among the electorate. Furthermore, institutional differences other than the
degree of democratic freedom (which we considered) may have interesting implications for
political economy linkages. In some countries, powerful elite groups have arguably
succeeded in influencing political decision-making to serve their own rent-seeking
purposes. In such circumstances, the reforms chosen likely differ from those that would
have been chosen in an ideal democracy.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
21
References
Aghion, P. and O. Blanchard (1994), “On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe,”
'()*	+		, 283-320.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” ) 	
,#-., 277-297.
Berg, A., E. Borensztein, R. Sahay and J. Zettelmeyer (1999), “The Evolution of Output in
Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences,” IMF Working Paper no. 73.
Blanchard, O. (1997), /	0
1	/		, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Brunetti, A., Kisunko, G. and Weder, B. (1997), “Institutional Obstacles to Doing
Business: Region-by-Region Results from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector,”
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 1759.
Campos, N. and F. Coricelli (2002), “Growth in transition: What we know, what we don’t
and what we should?” Journal of Economic Literature 40, 793-836.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1992), “Economic Reform and Dynamic Political
Constraints,” 	2	!3", 291-300.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1995), “The Design of Reform Packages under
Uncertainty,” +		) 85, 1207-23.
De Melo, M., C. Denizer and A. Gelb (1996), “From Plan to Market: Patterns of
Transition,” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1564.
Drazen, A. (2000), 0		*	, Princeton University Press.
Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D. (1991), “Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the
presence of individual-specific uncertainty,” +		)  81, 1146-56.
Fidrmuc, J. (2000), “Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition
countries,” 		) 44, 1491-1513.
Fidrmuc, J. (2001), “Economic Reform, Growth and Democracy during Post-Communist
Transition,” William Davidson Working Paper no. 372.
Fischer, S., Sahay, R. and Vegh, C. (1996), “From Transition to Market: Evidence and
Growth Prospects,” IMF Working Paper 98/52.
Fischer, S., Sahay, R. and Vegh, C. (1998), “Stabilization and Growth in Transition
Economies: The Early Experience,” 2		0  10, 45-66.
Havrylyshyn, O., I. Izvorski and R. van Rooden (1998), “Recovery and Growth in
Transition Economies 1990-97: A Stylized Regression Analysis,” IMF Working Paper
98/141.
Havrylyshyn, O, and R. van Rooden (2000), “Institutions matter in transition, but so do
policies,” IMF Working Paper 00/70.
Jackson, J. E., J. Klich and K. Poznanska (2001), “Economic transition and elections in
Poland,” William Davidson Working Paper no. 391.
Krueger, G. and M. Ciolko (1998), “A Note on Initial Conditions and Liberalization during
Transition,” 2	1 	 26, 718-734.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
evidence from post–communist transition in the 1990s
22
Lora, E. (1998), “What Makes Reforms Likely: Timing and Sequencing of Structural
Reforms in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 424.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000),0	5			 0,
MIT University Press.
Pirttilä, J. (2001), “Fiscal policy and structural reforms in transition economies: An
empirical analysis,” 	/		6, 29-52.
Rodrik, D. (1994), “The rush to free trade in the developing world: Why so late? Why
now? Will it last?” in 7	)809$:		#
	+#;	, Hagard, S. and Webb, S., eds., Washington D.C.
Rodrik, D. (1996), “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,”  2	  	
9, March 1996, 9-41.
Roland, G. (2000), /			#	80*	#<, Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Staehr, K. (2003) “Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, speed and sequencing”. BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 1/2003.
Warner, A M (2001), “Is economic reform popular at polls? Russia 1995,” 2	
1 	29, 448-465.
Wyplosz, C. (1993), “After the Honeymoon: On the Economics and the Politics of
Economic Transformation,”		)  37, 379-386.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
23
Tables
Table 1: Determinants of public support for a free market economy
Model 1 2 3 4

























































No. of obs.          67        69 53 55
R
2           0.29         0.28
F-test
F(8,58)=5.09
        [0.000]
F(4,64)=10.65




2(8)=    59.92
                  [0.000]
 
Chi
2(4)=    31.61










                  [0.405]
 
AR(1) test     -1.482 [0.138]     -1.627 [0.104]
AR(2) test       0.703 [0.482]       0.789 [0.430]
	
This table refers to STEP 1 regressions (dependent variable: support for reform).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. t-values are based on
robust standard errors and reported in brackets. Results in Column (1) and (2) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. p-values are indicated in squared brackets.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
evidence from post–communist transition in the 1990s
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Table 2: Determinants of progress in reforms
odel 123 4 5






































































No. of obs.       63      66 66 61 76
R





















      [0.445]
 
Chi
2(75)=   70.93




          [0.293]
 
AR(1) test -0.850 [0.395] -2.374 [0.018]
AR(2) test -1.090 [0.276] -1.231 [0.218]
	
 STEP 2 regressions (dependent variable: liberalisation index). *, ** and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. t-values are based on robust standard errors and
reported in brackets. Results in column (1) and (2) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. p-values are
indicated in squared brackets.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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Table 3: Determinants of economic growth
Model 1 2
Dependent var. Grow Grow




































No. of obs.                49 45
Wald (joint significance) Chi
2(7)=433.66  [0.000]
  Chi
2(10)=3263.39   [0.000]
 
(Sargan) test of overidentification Chi
2(20) =          18.74
                           [0.5385]
Chi2(20) =   21.87  [0.3476]
AR(1) test -2.34                   [0.0195]                       -2.20 [0.0281]
AR(2) test                     0.71 [0.480]                       -0.04 [0.971]
STEP 3 regressions (dependent variable: growth). *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. t-values are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets.
p-values are indicated in squared brackets.Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä The political economy of reforms: Empirical
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Table 4: Determinants of public support for a market economy: robustness check
Model 1 2 3 4
Dependent var. reform reform Reform Reform
Estimation
method


























































No. of obs.            56 60 53 59
R
2 0.43       0.38
F-test F(10.45)=4.69







                    [0.000]
Chi
2(4)=  21.47***





                   [1.000]
Chi
2(60)=73.23
                [0.117]
AR(1) test        -1.345 [0.179]  -1.628 [0.103]
AR(2) test         0.691 [0.490]   1.601 [0.109]
Alternative STEP 1 regressions. *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. t-values are reported in brackets and p-values squared brackets. Results in columns (1),
(2), (3) and (4) are corrected for heteroskedasticity.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2003
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Table 5: Determinants of progress in reforms: robustness check
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6















































































o. of obs. 63 81 63 81 61 70
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          0.379
[0.704]
Alternative STEP 2 regressions. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. t-values are reported in brackets and p-values squared brackets. Results in columns (1), (2), (3)
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